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Widely noted for the pleading revolution it furthers at the district
court level,' the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 also
makes important changes in the way federal appellate courts will resolve
the qualified immunity issues that arise in the course of Bivens

* 0 2010 by James E. Pfander. Owen L. Coon Professor of Law, Northwestern
University School of Law. This essay was supported by the Northwestern faculty
research program. Thanks to the editors of the Penn State Law Review and to conference
organizers for the invitation to participate in the conference on Iqbal at the Dickinson
School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University. Thanks as well to Eddie Hartnett,
and to my co-panelists Mark Brown, Gary Gildin, and Kit Kinports, for help with the
mysteries of qualified immunity law and for comments on an early draft of this essay.
1. For a modest sampling of the voluminous literature, see Robert G. Bone,
PlausibilityPleadingRevisited andRevised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2010); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After
Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, UnderstandingPleading
Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2009).
2. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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litigation.3 In brief, Iqbal confirms that qualified immunity-something
that the Court regarded as self-evidently an affirmative defense only a
generation ago4-will be treated as a matter on which the plaintiff bears
the burden of relatively specific pleading.5 This secures the government
officer's right to invoke qualified immunity by way of a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
What's more, Iqbal adopts a broad interpretation of the collateral order
doctrine that will allow the government to seek immediate appellate
review of virtually any rejected qualified immunity defense at the
pleading stage. While the Court had previously applied the collateral
order doctrine to orders rejecting claims of qualified immunity,8 the Iqbal
decision extends the doctrine to fact-bound determinations about the
sufficiency of allegations of fact that might be regarded as dubious
candidates for interlocutory review.9
One more change in the Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence
will tend to amplify the impact of the Iqbal decision. Earlier in the same
Term in which it decided Iqbal, the Court changed the decision rule that
governs the order in which the lower federal courts pass on constitutional
issues in the course of resolving qualified immunity claims. Under the
old rule of Saucier v. Katz,10 courts confronting qualified immunity
issues were obliged to reach the constitutional question and only then to
decide if the right in question was clearly enough established to
overcome the official's qualified immunity." Critics of the Saucier
approach identified such concerns as the problem of advisory opinions,
the difficulty of addressing some novel constitutional issues, and the
potentially awkward posture of cases awaiting further review at the

3. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a federal right of action for individuals who claim that
federal officers violated their constitutional rights). For an account of the circumstances
that gave rise to the litigation and to the factors that informed its resolution on appeal, see
James E. Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown-Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau ofNarcotics in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275 (Judith Resnik & Vicki C. Jackson
eds., 2009).
4. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
5. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-51.
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (authorizing motion by defendant to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted).
7. See Mark R. Brown, Qualhfied Immunity and Interlocutory Fact Finding in the
Courts ofAppeals, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1317 (2010).
8. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
9. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1946-47 (distinguishing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304
(1995)).

10.
11.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
Id.
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Supreme Court.12 In response, the Court overturned Saucier in Pearson
v. Callahan,'3 substituting a regime of judicial discretion for the old
mandatory decision order. 14 Today, federal courts need not pass on the
constitutional issue; they can simply decide that the right, if any, was not
clearly established."
Together, these changes represent a remarkable exercise of judicial
creativity in re-fashioning the system by which plaintiffs pursue
constitutional tort claims. In the course of a generation, the Court has
transformed the test for qualified immunity from one that turns on the
official's subjective good faith to an objective test that focuses on the
clarity of the constitutional right at issue.' 6 Along with this change, the
Court has altered the nature of qualified immunity, from an affirmative
defense that focuses on the official's conduct and mindset to a
requirement of constitutional clarity that has become an element of the
plaintiffs affirmative claim for relief." With the Court's expansion of
interlocutory appellate review, it has now assured that all such issues will
be addressed by the appellate courts sooner rather than later. One can
see the conclusion of this transformative series of decisions in the
Court's description of the issue in Iqbal: did the plaintiff plead sufficient
factual matter that, if taken as true, "states a claim that [government
officials] deprived him of his clearly established constitutional rights."
Iqbal ensures that the appellate court will pass on this question at an
early stage in the process.
This collection of evolving judge-made rules contrasts with two
related bodies of law in which the Court has expressed reluctance to
fashion federal common law. Consider first the attitude toward the
recognition of rights of action under Bivens. In a series of cases
12. For a summary of these difficulties, see Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808
(2009).
13. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
14. Id. at 818.
15. For a criticism, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in
Constitutional Torts (unpublished draft on file with author and available through SSRN)
(arguing that Saucier plays a valuable role in ensuring development of constitutional law
in areas where few alternative forms of constitutional litigation exist).
16. Compare Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (defining the officer's immunity
to include an element of subjective good faith) with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982) (articulating an objective immunity standard that turns on the clarity with which
the constitutional right had been recognized at the time of the officer's action).
17. On the treatment of official immunity as an affirmative defense, see Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). Cf Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (assigning to
the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution claim the burden of pleading and proving that the
defendant acted without probable cause). For an account of the Court's modification of
qualified immunity, see Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, QualifiedImmunity, and Crystal
Balls: Predictingthe Course of ConstitutionalLaw, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 115 (1991).
18. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009).
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stretching back several years, the Court has taken a narrow view of the
availability of constitutional tort claims against federal officers, citing a
range of special factors that counsel hesitation in the judicial recognition
of such proceedings.19 Most recently, in Wilkie v. Robbins,2 0 the Court
declined to recognize an action for government retaliation against an
individual who stood on his Fifth Amendment rights in fending off the
Interior Department's request for an easement across his land.21 The
Court's reluctance to fashion new rights of action echoes through its
decision in Ashcroft v. 1qbal; indeed, the Court there simply assumed
without deciding that the plaintiffs claim for discriminatory detention
and treatment on religious and ethnic grounds stated a claim under the
First and Fifth Amendments.22
The same diffidence informs the Court's attitude (at least outside
the qualified immunity context) toward the collateral order doctrine. The
doctrine arose in the 1950s as an exception to the final judgment rule23
and was adapted to provide for interlocutory review of qualified
immunity defenses to constitutional tort claims. In Mohawk Industries,
Inc. v. Carpenter,2 4 the Court suggested that a more restrictive approach
25
In the course of refusing to allow
was generally appropriate.
interlocutory review of an order adverse to a party's invocation of the
attorney-client privilege, the Court suggested that its reluctance to
recognize judge-made exceptions to finality flowed in part from the fact
that Congress had authorized the "bench and bar" to collaborate, through
the rule-making process, in fashioning exceptions to the final judgment
rule.26 Justice Thomas made the same point more emphatically in his
Mohawk concurrence; he argued that the Court should categorically
decline to recognize any new collateral orders but should leave that task
to the rule-making process.2 7

19. For accounts of these developments, viewed from different perspectives, see
John F. Preis, ConstitutionalEnforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REv. 1663 (2009); George
D. Brown, "Counter-Counter-Terrorismvia Lawsuit" The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL.
L. REV. 841 (2009). For an evaluation of Iqbal's importance in national security
litigation, see Steven I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 255 (2010).
20. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007)
21. See id.
22. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944-47.
23. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949). For an
assessment, see Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the
FederalCourts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89,90 (1975).
24. Mohawk Industries, Inc., v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).
2 5. Id.
26.

Id. at 609.

27.

Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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In this essay, I explore the tensions revealed by the juxtaposition of
these lines of cases. As Iqbal confirms, the Court has displayed a
remarkable willingness to re-fashion the rules of qualified immunity and
interlocutory review without awaiting legislative guidance. Yet the
Court has largely declined to extend the Bivens doctrine. After sketching
these doctrinal realities in part I, part II traces their application in the
Iqbal decision. Part III examines some possible justifications for the
Court's on-again, off-again attitude toward the legitimacy of judge-made
law. Three concerns likely brook large in the Court's thinking: a concern
with the docket implications of expanding access to the Bivens remedy, a
perception that the claims in question mostly lack support on the merits,
and a perception that Congress has a uniquely important role to play in
judging the desirability of expanded access to the federal courts. The
essay evaluates these justifications and explores the puzzles they present
for the preservation of a workable body of government accountability
law.
I.

THREE DOCTRINES IN SEARCH OF A CONSISTENT JUDICIAL ROLE

Many scholars have remarked on the Supreme Court's reluctance in
recent years to recognize new rights of action under the Bivens
doctrine.28 The Bivens Court itself, of course, was tackling a Fourth
Amendment claim and had no occasion to address the enforcement of
other constitutional rights. Since then, the Court has recognized rights of
action to enforce the equal protection component of due process and to
challenge cruel and unusual punishment.2 9 It also seemed to confirm that
individuals could seek damages against government officials who
retaliated against them for exercising their constitutional right to freedom
of speech.30 More recently, however, the Court has persistently declined
to authorize new actions under Bivens. In CorrectionalServices Inc. v.
Malesko,31 for example, the Court turned back a claim against a
28. See, e.g., James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy
and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117 (2009); Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a
Thousand Cuts: ConstitutionalWrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 20062007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23 (2007). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F.
MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 841-45 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].

29. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980).
30. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (assuming the viability of a
whistleblower's claim of unconstitutional retaliation); cf Hartmann v. Moore, 547 U.S.
250, 256 (2006) (specifying that, in a retaliation claim against postal officials, the
plaintiff must plead and prove that the officials acted to initiate criminal proceedings
without probable cause).
31. Correctional Services Inc. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
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privately-run correctional facility and in Wilkie v. Robbins3 2 the Court
Recent
rejected a Fifth Amendment property-based retaliation claim.
decisions display a growing judicial suspicion of the Bivens decision
itself, and an accompanying reluctance to recognize federal rights of
action to enforce other constitutional rights.3 4
The judicial passivity in the latest Bivens cases contrasts sharply
with the Court's creative refinement of the (judge-made) doctrine of
qualified immunity.35 Although the origins of qualified immunity have
never been adequately explored or explained,36 the doctrine bears some
evidence of having developed from the nineteenth-century application of
common law privileges to suits seeking to impose defamation liability on
During the twentieth century, the Court
government officials.3
expanded these common law privileges, applying them first to other tort
claims against government officials and then to constitutional tort claims
brought under the authority of the Bivens doctrine. The evolution of the
doctrine reveals a striking willingness on the part of the Court to re-shape
immunity law in response to a judicial assessment of how to balance the
interests of victims in effective redress and those of government workers
in freedom from the burden of litigation.

32. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
33. See, e.g., Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (questioning the propriety of the Court's role in
fashioning rights of action to enforce the Constitution); Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537 (concluding
that the right of action in question was a matter for legislative, not judicial creation).
34. See Wilkie 551 U.S. at 568, (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Malesko, 534 U.S.
at 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
35. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SuP. CT.
REv. 343 (2002).
36. The absolute immunity doctrine, which the Court has extended to government
officers performing legislative and judicial work, derives from common law principles.
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (summarizing the history of the doctrine).
In contrast, qualified immunity did not apply to government officials at common law.
Instead, the courts in the early nineteenth century applied a relatively strict rule of
common law liability and refused to accord government officials a defense for having
acted in good faith or in compliance with the instructions of a superior. See Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). For an account of the Little v. Barreme litigation
and the way congressional indemnity practices informed the courts' refusal to recognize
qualified immunity defenses, see James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs
and PrivateBills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic,
85 N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (unpublished article on file with author).
37. Thus, in Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), the Court held that the
postmaster general was entitled to claim a privilege from defamation liability for
injurious statements made in the course of his duties. Later cases, including Gregoirev.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), and Barrv. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), also look
to common law privileges in defining federal official immunity from suit.
38. For examples of the Court's attempts to strike this balance, see Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See part II.
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One can see just how creative the Court has been by comparing its
approach to that of the courts (state and federal) that addressed official
liability in the nineteenth century. In that era, suits against government
officers provided the only mechanism- for vindicating the rights of
individuals in their interactions with the government; sovereign
But the
immunity blocked suits against the government itself."
government worked around sovereign immunity with a division of labor
between the branches: courts were charged with deciding the legality of
government activity in suits brought against officials; successful suits
produced judgments running against the official; and the officials (or
their victims) sought compensation from Congress through the passage
of private appropriations bills. 40 A recent study of the nineteenth century
reveals that federal government officers filed dozens of petitions for
private bill relief and secured indemnity in roughly two-thirds of the
cases after persuading Congress that they were acting in the scope of
their employment and in accordance with their instructions.4 1
The practice of judicial assessment of legality and legislative
assessment of scope of employment issues meant that the courts
routinely rejected arguments for qualified or good faith immunity. In the
famous early case of Little v. Barreme,4 2 an action for damages brought
against a naval officer of the United States, Chief Justice Marshall
described the Court's refusal to recognize the officer's immunity from
the strict liability regime of the common law:
I was strongly inclined to think that where, in consequence of orders
from the legitimate authority, a vessel is seized with pure intention,
the claim of the injured party for damages would be against that
government from which the orders proceeded, and would be a proper
subject for negotiation. But I have been convinced that I was
mistaken, and I have receded from this first opinion. I acquiesce in
that of my brethren, which is, that the instructions cannot change the
nature of the transaction, or legalize an act43 which without those
instructions would have been a plain trespass.
Marshall's ultimate view, as shaped by his colleagues, may well have
reflected the Court's perception that Congress bore responsibility for
39. For a valuable discussion of the role of the appropriations power of the general
assembly and its relationship to sovereign immunity, see Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh,
The AppropriationsPower and Sovereign Immunity, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1207 (2009). See
also Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and
JudicialIndependence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 521 (2003).
40. For examples of such legislation, see note 44 infra.
41. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 36, Appendix.
42. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
43. Id. at 179 (1804).
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indemnifying Captain Little, thus ensuring the compensation of the
victim of unlawful government conduct and the protection of an officer
who had acted in compliance with official instructions. Little was among
the first federal officers to seek indemnity, and he did so successfully,
securing a private bill that paid the judgment against him."
Other courts in the nineteenth century shared the view that officers
who committed common law trespasses, strictly construed, were to be
held accountable, subject to the possibility that Congress would pass
indemnifying legislation if they were acting within the scope of their
employment. For example, in a suit for a wrongful seizure against a
federal government tax collector, Joshua Sands, the New York state court
rejected the officer's good faith defense.45 As the court explained, the
judicial role was simply to "pronounce the law as we find it" and leave
"cases of hardship, where any exist, to legislative provision.A6
Similarly, a federal postal official named Nathaniel Mitchell was held
strictly liable by the state court in Maine for causing the arrest of a
subordinate official on the reasonable, but mistaken, belief that the
official had stolen a package from the mail. 4 7 On review of the jury's
verdict before entry of judgment, Mitchell argued that he had probable
cause and had acted without malice.48 The court rejected this argument:
the prosecution resulted from the defendant's act in response to the
missing package, not from any suspicious conduct on the part of the
subordinate. 4 9 As the court explained, it was proper for the jury to hold
Mitchell accountable on these facts for malicious conduct.50 Otherwise
the victim would have no remedy "for losses and expenses growing out
of the charge, to say nothing of personal suffering and lacerated
feelings." 5 Both Sands and Mitchell successfully petitioned Congress
for the adoption of a private bill of indemnity. 5 2
One finds in the nineteenth century model a rather modest
conception of the judicial function that contrasts sharply with the view of
44. See An Act for the Relief of George Little, ch. 4th, 6 Stat. 63 (Feb. 17, 1807).
Little's application for a private bill followed an earlier, and similarly successful, petition
by Captain Murray. See An Act for the Relief of Alexander Murray, Cong. 8th, Sess. 2d,
ch. 12, 6 Stat. 56 (Jan. 31, 1805) (indemnifying Murray for liability imposed against him
in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)).
45. See Imlay v. Sands, I Cai 566 (N.Y. Sup. 1804).
46. Id. at 567.
47. See Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439 (Me. 1836).
48. Id. at 446.
49. See id. at 457 ("We cannot but regard it as too much to hold this to have been
probable cause, to justify a prosecution against an innocent and unoffending man, who
had given no color for suspicion against him.").
50. Id. at 458.
51. Id.
52. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 36, Appendix.
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today. Nineteenth century courts passed solely on the issue of legality
and left the task of determining issues of good faith, immunity, and
indemnity to the legislative branch. The task of balancing the interest of
the victim in vindication of his rights and that of the officer in securing
protection against liability for actions in the course of employment fell to
Congress. Today, by contrast, the Court has explicitly taken on the task
of attempting to calibrate the incentives of federal officers who face
Thus, while the Court has acknowledged the
personal liability.
importance of compensating victims and deterring government
wrongdoing, it has also sought to minimize what it has called the
"social costs" associated with official liability. These costs include "the
expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of
public office." 5 4 In addition, the Court has expressed concern that the
threat of liability "'will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of
their duties.'" 5 5 Nineteenth century courts (and the members of Congress
who adopted the pay and incentive packages for government officers and
the private indemnity bills that protected them from liability) would have
viewed this task of ensuring official zeal in the face of personal liability
as a matter for legislative rather than judicial determination.
Even if one were to accept (in contrast to nineteenth century
observers) that courts have a role to play, the Court's refinement of
immunity law in the last generation represents a remarkable example of
judicial creativity. In the space of only fifteen years, the Court moved
from an immunity defense tailored to the specific claim to one that
applied to all federal officials without regard to the duties of their office
or the nature of the underlying claim. Thus, in the pre-Bivens case of
Pierson v. Ray, the Court extended an immunity defense to an officer
sued for claims comparable to false arrest, reasoning that the law should
not impose liability where the police officer acted in good faith and with
probable cause.56 By the time of Procunierv. Navarette, the Court had
grown impatient with immunity defenses tailored to the specific tort at
issue and announced, over Justice Stevens's dissent, a more uniform
53. Id. at 819.
54. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
55. Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)); see also Butz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1977) (noting the importance of encouraging "the
vigorous exercise of official authority").
56. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967) (analogizing claim to one for
false arrest and drawing on common law defenses of good faith and probable cause to
define the official's immunity). The Maine Supreme Court's decision in Merriam v.
Mitchell, casts some doubt on the accuracy of the Court's reconstruction of common law
norms.
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standard. Notably, the Procunierdecision introduces the idea that the
immunity defense may depend on the clarity of the law the official
allegedly violated. The Court completed its transformation of immunity
law in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,defining immunity entirely by reference to
the existence of a clearly established constitutional right and abstracting
away from any inquiry into the official's mental state or into the common
law's handling of analogous legal claims or defenses.
Apart from cutting itself loose from older norms, the Court
explicitly framed its new qualified immunity standard with a view
toward facilitating the government official's motion for summary
judgment. Under the old approach, disputes over immunity often
necessitated a jury trial to resolve the subjective good faith of the officer
as a matter of fact. The Harlow Court shifted from a subjective to an
objective inquiry, transforming the issue of immunity into a matter of
law to facilitate summary judgment." This change in immunity law also
worked a fundamental alteration in the burden of pleading constitutional
torts. As late as 1980, two years before the Harlow decision, the Court
continued to view qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. Thus, in
Gomez v. Toledo, the Court ruled unanimously that the plaintiff had no
obligation to allege that the defendant was motivated by bad faith.o The
Harlow Court purported to leave this burden undisturbed.6 ' But shortly
after Harlow came down, the lower federal courts began to insist that the

57. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (defining official immunity
as depending both on the clarity of the law and any malicious intent on the part of the
defendant). Cf. Procunier, 434 U.S. at 568-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the
majority of adopting a single uniform standard of immunity that applies without regard to
the particular nature of the claim and office).
58. See Harlow,457 U.S. at 818 (extending immunity to officials so long as they do
not violate clearly established federal law); see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating
Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259 (2000), for a critique of the one-size-fits-all
standard of qualified immunity.

59. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasizing the need for an objective standard to
facilitate summary adjudication of insubstantial claims).
60. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980). The Court relied on familiar
considerations in allocating the burden of pleading to the defendant. Thus, the Court
noted that it had never indicated that qualified immunity was relevant to the "existence of
plaintiffs cause of action." Id. at 640. Moreover, the Court relied on the fact that the
defendant would ordinarily have better access to information about his own mental state.
Id. at 641. Of course, once Harlow switched to a subjective standard based on the clarity
of the right involved, the defendant's informational advantage disappeared.
61. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (reciting that qualified or good faith immunity is an
"affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official"); cf Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (continuing to characterize qualified immunity as an
affirmative defense that the defendant must raise in the pleadings).
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plaintiff furnish allegations detailed enough to support a conclusion that
the government official violated clearly established norms.62
This lower court shift toward placing the burden of more specific
pleading on the plaintiff led the Court to grant review in a case that
presented the issue. In Siegert v. Gilley, the lower court had refused to
allow the plaintiff to take limited discovery into the official's mental
After
state based on allegations that the official acted with malice.
sidestepped
the
Court
granting certiorari on the complaint's sufficiency,
the pleading question by concluding that the law did not establish a
liberty interest in one's reputation with the clarity necessary to overcome
the officer's immunity defense to a Bivens action.65 In a brief concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy addressed the pleading question.
Foreshadowing his conclusion eighteen years later for the majority in
Iqbal, Justice Kennedy concluded that the claimant had failed to
"alleg[e] facts from which malice could be inferred with other than the
most conclusory allegations."6 6 Both the majority and the concurring
opinions thus regarded qualified immunity as an issue on which the
plaintiff bore the burden of pleading and an issue ripe for consideration
on the government's motion to dismiss.
One final refinement of immunity law began in the 1980s and
figured in the Court's approach to Iqbal. In 1985, the Court ruled that
government officials could seek interlocutory appellate review of nonfinal decisions rejecting motions to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds. Although such orders were not technically final, the Court
found in Mitchell v. Forsyth that they satisfied the terms of the collateral
order doctrine.6 The decision was, to say the least, something of a
departure from established doctrine. The collateral order doctrine applies
when the district court conclusively resolves an important issue, separate
62. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (approving lower court
decisions that require an evaluation of qualified immunity in the context of the particular
factual setting in which the officer acted). For an account, see Brown, supra note 7, at
1319.
63. See generally Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (collecting lower court
authority).
64. See id. The plaintiffs allegations of malice apparently met the standard of Rule
9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the lower court found that a more
demanding pleading standard was required to overcome qualified immunity.
65. Id. at 233-34 (rejecting the complaint's sufficiency after concluding that the
reputational claim was legally unsound).
66. Id. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67. See Caitlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945) for the classic definition of
technical finality as an order that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment.
68. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (extending government
officers a right to interlocutory appellate review of decisions that reject a qualified
immunity defense).
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from the merits, that cannot be effectively reviewed after a final
judgment. Decisions rejecting a qualified immunity defense may well
satisfy the conclusive and importance prongs of the analysis, but they can
scarcely be regarded as separate from the merits and they do not evade
After all, following the Court's refinement of qualified
review.
immunity law in Harlow, the existence of the immunity depends almost
entirely on the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claim. Only claims
to vindicate clearly established rights may proceed to judgment.
Immunity issues thus overlap with the merits to a substantial degree.
They also present questions of law that an appellate court can review
after a final judgment. The Court worked around these doctrinal rough
patches by re-conceptualizing qualified immunity for purposes of review
in the federal system as a right not to stand trial; 69 so viewed, the right
was portrayed as one that could not be effectively vindicated without
review of the immunity issue during the pre-trial phase of the litigation.70
II.

EXPLORING THE IQBAL COURT'S VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE

Supreme Court decisions frequently make new law. But the opinion
in Iqbal stands out both for the striking ambition of its judicial
lawmaking in some areas and for the sheer modesty of its conception of
the judicial role in other areas. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Iqbal drew
on all three elements of the Court's evolving Bivens jurisprudence. For
starters, Justice Kennedy delivered on his promise in Siefert to re-work
the rules of pleading in constitutional tort cases; his opinion in Iqbal
requires specific, non-conclusory allegations of misconduct to overcome
a government official's qualified immunity. In addition to holding that
more detail was required, Justice Kennedy confirmed that the burden of
pleading fell on the plaintiff; his opinion asks if the allegations in the
complaint were sufficient to state a claim that the defendants had
violated "clearly established constitutional rights."7 ' Finally, Justice
Kennedy confirmed that the sufficiency of the complaint's allegations
were a proper subject for immediate appellate review under Mitchell v.
Forsyth.
69. One might assume, based on this conception of qualified immunity as an
immunity from trial, that the state courts would owe a similar obligation to provide
interlocutory review of rejected qualified immunity claims. But the Court did not agree.
See Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S. 911, 913 (1997) (rejecting the argument that state
courts must make available interlocutory review of rejected claims of qualified immunity
in the context of a section 1983 claim against state officials). Because the federal
government removes Bivens actions to federal court as a matter of course, the state courts
would predictably have little opportunity to evaluate the need for interlocutory review of
a rejected qualified immunity defense by a federal officer.
70. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530.
71. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009).
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The Bivens Issue

Juxtaposed against these assertions of a vigorous lawmaking role,
Justice Kennedy's refusal to recognize the existence of a right of action
under Bivens seems hard to explain. Previous decisions had made clear
that equal protection violations on the part of officials of the federal
government give rise to Bivens claims;7 2 the plaintiffs in Iqbal alleged
that they were targeted for detention under harsh conditions on the basis
of their race, ethnicity, and religious affiliation in violation of both the
First and Fifth Amendments. The Court disposed of the issue by
assuming the viability of the religious discrimination claim." But the
Court pointed out that it had never found an implied damages remedy
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and observed
that it had even declined to extend Bivens to a claim "sounding in the
First Amendment." 74 After making these observations, the Court
expressed a willingness to assume that the claim was actionable under
Bivens.
What accounts for the Court's refusal to address and confirm the
existence of a Bivens action for allegations that an immigration detainee
was deliberately mistreated on the basis of his religious affiliation? One
might assume from the Court's citation of authority that the possible
existence of alternative remedies was a factor in the decision. After all,
the case to which the Court pointed as illustrating its refusal to extend a
right to sue for First Amendment violations (Bush v. Lucas) was one in
which the Court relied heavily on the existence of alternative remedies as
special factors counseling hesitation in the recognition of a Bivens
remedy. But in Iqbal, the Court did not point to any relevant source of
alternative remedies and one cannot say with confidence that any such
remedies existed. The plaintiff had been released from detention and
could not secure relief through the invocation of a habeas corpus remedy;
in any case, the plaintiffs were not challenging the fact or duration of
their confinement so the habeas remedy was inapposite. 7 6 Common law
avenues of relief against federal officials were curtailed with the
72. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979).
73. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
74. Id. (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983)).
75. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 381-89 (detailing the rise of civil service remedies for
federal government employees).
76. The Court has long held that habeas relief applies to petitions that challenge the
fact or duration of confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)
(foreclosing state prisoner reliance on 1983 suits to challenge the fact or duration of
confinement). The federal courts have generally adopted the same distinction in
coordinating habeas and other remedies available to federal prisoners. See, e.g., Walker
v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 639 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the PLRA does not apply to
habeas petitions).
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adoption of the Westfall Act.7 7 Remedies may have been available
against the government under the FTCA for intentional torts, but the
Court has refused to treat the possible existence of an FTCA claim as
displacing the Bivens remedy. 8 The complaint had also alleged claims
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a possible source of
Bivens-displacing federal law. But the lower court had rejected the
RFRA claims and the Court did not have any occasion to address that
statute's applicability to federal government officials.79
Without any obvious alternative remedies available, the Court's
failure to recognize a Bivens action may instead reflect genuine doubts as
to the right of individuals to pursue a damages claim for intentional,
religiously-based mistreatment at the hands of the federal government.
That's an unsettling possibility. Lower courts have consistently viewed
free exercise claims as stating a valid basis for relief under Bivens80 and
section 1983 .81 As a consequence, free exercise litigation in the lower
courts focuses not on the existence of a right to sue under Bivens, but on
the degree to which government activity appears to interfere with the
practice of religion and the clarity of the legal framework at issue for

77. The Westfall Act affords federal officials absolute immunity from liability on
common law claims, so long as the government certifies that the officials were acting
within the course and scope of their employment. See generally Pfander & Baltmanis,
supra note 28, at 133-34 (describing the process of certification and the transformation of
claims into actions against the federal government under the FTCA).
78. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (treating the FTCA remedy as
supplementary to, rather than preemptive of, the right of action for cruel treatment by
federal prisoners); see generally Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 28, at 121 (describing
Congress's decision in the 1974 amendments to the FTCA to provide additional remedies
for the federal government's intentional torts and its decision to preserve the Bivens
remedy for constitutional violations).
79. See lqbal v. Ashcroft, 490 F.3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (recounting the district
court's dismissal of the RFRA claims on the theory that the liability of federal
government officials under the statute was not clearly enough established to overcome
their immunity); see also Rasul v. Meyers, 563 F.3d 527, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(expressing doubt that military detention officers are persons within the meaning of the
RFRA). Finally, see Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 160, for the lower court's rejection of the
argument that the post-9/11 setting established special factors counseling hesitation in the
recognition of a Bivens action.
80. See, e.g., Resnick v. Adams, 317 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2003) (assuming the
viability of a Bivens free exercise claim relating to the provision of kosher food);
Weinberger v. Grimes, No. 07-6461, 2009 WL 331632 (6th Cir. 2009) (assuming
viability of Bivens claim and evaluating prison officials' accommodations); cf Iqbal v.
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (raising doubts as to application of free exercise
claims by non-resident aliens housed at Guantanamo Bay).
81. See, e.g., Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 427 F.3d 525 (8th Cir.
2010) (free exercise claim was clearly established such that official defense of qualified
immunity was unavailable); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009) (sustaining
1983 claim that warden had substantially burdened prisoner's exercise of religion by
failing to accommodate dietary restrictions).
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qualified immunity purposes. In prison litigation, for example, cases
often turn on the degree to which prison officials have complied with
their obligation to accommodate the religious practices of the inmate
population. 82 Rejection of a Bivens-based right to sue would deprive
inmates of their ability to secure a judicial evaluation of their religious
freedom claims.83
Apart from the unsettling possibility that the Court contemplates the
rejection of a Bivens action to enforce free exercise rights, its decision to
assume but not decide the issue poses a problem for the sound
administration of justice. It makes little sense to specify pleading rules
for a claim that the Court does not regard as viable. The whole point of a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to determine if the facts alleged
show an entitlement to relief. Courts must find or make the law and then
ask if the facts suffice to make out a claim under that law. Not
surprisingly, then, the last time the Court addressed the elements of a
plaintiff s claim for relief under Bivens, it first confirmed the viability of
the claim and only then focused on the pleading requirements. 84 In other
words, the existence of a right to sue was seen as an essential precursor
to the Court's discussion of the elements of the claim. The Iqbal Court
alters this order of decision, assuming the existence of a Bivens action
and then extending Twombly's more demanding plausibility pleading
requirements to the Bivens context.8 5 After Iqbal, insufficiently detailed
82. See Resnick, 317 F.3d at 1061-63; see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 352 (1987); Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th
Cir. 1995).
83. Much of the legislation adopted in the past several years has assumed the
existence of a Bivens action for individuals housed in federal facilities or prisons. Both
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) qualify to some extent the right of
inmates of federal prisons to pursue Bivens claims. Among the claims that Congress
subjected to the restrictions of the PRLA were those for the free exercise of religion. The
legislation thus confirms and qualifies the Bivens action to some extent and provides
scant support for a judicial decision to eliminate the availability of judicial oversight
altogether.
84. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (squarely holding that the
plaintiff could pursue a Bivens action for wrongful prosecution in retaliation for the
exercise of rights under the First Amendment).
85. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (extending the Twombly
plausibility standard to all complaints under the Federal Rules). The Court's new
pleading requirements thus apply to all Bivens claims, including those for race-based
discrimination, that turn on a showing of intentionally or purposefully discriminatory
conduct. We thus have an approach to the Bivens question that parallels, to some extent,
the way the Court now structures the analysis of qualified immunity. Under Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009), federal courts need not pass on the existence of a
constitutional right before deciding that the right in question was not clearly enough
established to overcome the official's qualified immunity. Similarly, Iqbal invites the
federal courts to evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint without necessarily concluding
that the law recognizes a right of action for the constitutional claim at issue.
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allegations may derail many a Bivens claim without necessitating any
determination of the viability of the action itself.
B.

The CollateralReview Issue

The prospect that factual sufficiency issues may crowd out
evaluations of applicable law helps to frame the question of whether the
Court should have extended the collateral order doctrine to authorize
interlocutory review of the sufficiency of Iqbal's complaint. As noted
above, the Court had applied the doctrine to qualified immunity
decisions in Mitchell v. Forsyth, but later decisions cast doubt on the
extension of Mitchell to factually rich questions.86 In Johnson v. Jones,
Justice Breyer wrote for a unanimous Court in concluding that an
immediate appeal was not available from an order denying an official's
Unlike the order in
immunity-based summary judgment motion.
and
its application to an
Mitchell, which involved an interpretation of law
agreed-upon set of facts, the order in Johnson was based on a trial
judge's finding that there was sufficient factual matter in the summary
judgment record to create a genuine issue for the jury to resolve. To
such an order, the Johnson Court found that the collateral review
doctrine did not apply: it was too fact-bound, unlike the legal question
addressed in Mitchell; it was not really separate from the merits in the
sense that the same sort of issues could well arise after the trial; and, it
presented issues of factual detail that the district court was better suited
to address than the appellate court. 87
The order on review in Iqbal occupies a space mid-way between the
orders in Mitchell and Johnson. Deciding on the sufficiency of the
complaint in Iqbal requires a court both to define the parameters of
clearly established law (Mitchell) and to parse the record to ascertain if
the allegations contain the requisite level of factual detail to bring that
legal principle into play (Johnson). The case thus required the appellate
court to do more than find the law; under the new pleading standard
applied in Iqbal, the court must evaluate the allegations in the complaint
to determine if they provide "plausible," non-conclusory, factual support
for the plaintiffs theory of liability.88 This task of closely parsing
allegations normally falls to the district court, and it can involve
precisely the sort of fact-based inquiry that the Johnson Court found to

86. Compare Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (allowing interlocutory
review of qualified immunity defense) with Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995)
(rejecting interlocutory review of the factual record underlying a motion for summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds).
87. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at .319-20.
88. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948-51 (2009).
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be inconsistent with the appellate court's comparative advantage in
finding the law. Iqbal will require both the district court and the
appellate court to review the factual sufficiency of every Bivens
complaint: a decision granting dismissal of the complaint on a 12(b)(6)
motion would be a final order, entitling the plaintiff to seek review, and
the denial of a 12(b)(6) motion would trigger Iqbal's collateral order
holding, thereby enabling the defendant to seek review.8 9
One can certainly question the wisdom of bringing immediate
appellate oversight to bear on the factual sufficiency of every Bivens
complaint. Indeed, it seems likely that a post-Iqbal concern with factual
sufficiency will prompt plaintiffs to file ever more detailed complaints as
90
they attempt to anticipate and head-off qualified immunity arguments.
Moreover, it seems likely that the government will counter these
relatively more detailed allegations with affidavits and other evidence
aimed at contesting the allegations in the complaint. Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the inclusion of such affidavits can trigger a
transformation of the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment,
with an accompanying right to take tailored discovery, if necessary, to
enable the non-moving party, typically the plaintiff, to establish an issue
of fact. 9' Depending on the district court's response to the inclusion of
affidavits, the government's motion to dismiss might evolve into an
evaluation of the existence of a genuine issue of fact. The rationale of
the Johnson Court's refusal to involve the appellate courts squarely
applies to the pre-trial review of such factual issues.
Apart from leading to appellate review of factually dense
complaints and affidavits, the Court's embrace of interlocutory review in
Iqbal seems hard to square with the ethos of restraint in Mohawk
There, the Court confronted an
Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter.9 2
order adverse to a party's claim of
of
an
review
application for collateral
The opinion for the Court by Justice
attorney-client privilege.
Sotomayor patiently explained why collateral order review was
89. See, e.g., al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009).
90. The complaint in Iqbal itself included 24 separate counts against a variety of
federal government officials.
91. FED.R.Civ.P. 12(d) provides that if the district court allows the defendant to
introduce affidavits bearing on an issue of fact in the complaint, the court should
transform the motion into one under FED. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment and allow
the parties to take any discovery needed to resolve such a motion. As long as some
uncertainty surrounds the applicable legal standard, it probably makes sense to view
factual issues as proper subjects for appellate review alongside interlocutory review of
the issue of what the law clearly establishes. But if the government were to agree that the
law was clear, one could fairly doubt the propriety of interlocutory review based solely
on the government's contention that the factual allegations were insufficiently detailed to
raise an inference that the officer committed the offense in question.
92. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).
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unnecessary in light of the other modes of securing review available to
the party in question.93 More interesting for present purposes, the Court
also suggested that it would no longer adopt judge-made expansions of
the collateral order doctrine. 94 In particular, the Court pointed to the
adoption of legislative changes to the rules enabling act that empower the
judiciary to promulgate rules of appellate finality and interlocutory
review through the rule-making process.95 The Court expressed support
for reliance on a rule-making process that it described as drawing on the
"collective experience of bench and bar" in the promulgation of
"measured, practical" solutions.96 Further avenues of interlocutory
review were thus to be "furnished, if at all, through rulemaking, with the
opportunity for full airing it provides." 97
Justice Thomas also embraced rulemaking in his concurrence,
arguing that the Court had erred in conducting a collateral order
In Justice Thomas's view, the Court should have simply
analysis.
remitted the parties to the rulemaking process, without holding open the
possibility that they might secure a judge-made rule of interlocutory
review. 99 Justice Thomas cited the 1qbal decision, which preceded
Mohawk by a scant seven months, to illustrate his point. 00 The apparent
purpose of the citation was to draw attention to language in Iqbal that
acknowledged a certain lack of principle in the Court's application of the
0
There was more than a little irony in the
collateral order doctrine.o'
reference, given that Justice Thomas had joined an Iqbal majority that
expanded the collateral order doctrine and significantly re-worked the
rules governing the required particularity of factual allegations. 10 2
93. See id. at 606-09.
94. See id. at 609.
95. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2006), which authorizes the judiciary to
define finality by rule, and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), which authorizes the rule makers to
adopt rules for interlocutory review in addition to those set forth in the statute).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. See id. at 610.
100. See id. at 611 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (2009)).
101. See id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1946 (explaining that the doctrine may have
"expanded beyond the limits dictated by its internal logic" and the strict requirements of
prior decisions)).
102. I credit Professor Stephen Burbank for pointing out this irony to me. Thus, Iqbal
makes clear that the Court's new judge-made plausibility pleading rules apply to all
litigation in federal court, not just to suits brought to enforce the antitrust laws.
Moreover, Iqbal confirms that the new dispensation applies even to cases in which the
plaintiff seeks to pursue the sort of intent-based discrimination claims on which the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seemingly demand only the barest of notice pleading.
As critics have noted, repeatedly and at some length, this change in the rules of pleading
by top-down judicial fiat seems hard to square with the bottom-up approach to pleading
institutionalized in the Rules Advisory process. Under that regime, the committee on
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Neither aspect of the decision demonstrates notable deference to the rulemaking process.
III. EXPLAINING THE IQBAL COURT'S APPROACH
What then accounts for the Court's Janus-faced attitude to the
business of judicial lawmaking? On the one hand, the Court embraced
judge-made law with gusto in adapting the rules of qualified immunity
and in crafting pleading rules and extensions of the collateral order
doctrine. On the other hand, the Court has expressed a grave reluctance
to recognize what it chooses to characterize as new rights of action under
Bivens to enforce the Constitution. While the Court speaks of the
necessity of deference to the legislative branch and rulemaking process
in the Bivens context, its own dispositions reveal no consistent practice
of deference.
In attempting to account for the disparity in the Court's approach, I
resist the answer of judicial attitudes or politics. To be sure, we have
known since the dawn of legal realism that a judge's priors inform her
approach to legal questions and may influence the outcomes of cases,
especially in situations where the doctrine creates space for the play of
judicial discretion. We have, moreover, a growing body of evidence that
the attitudes of the Justices of the Supreme Court bear strongly on the
outcome of cases. 103 But judges nonetheless act within a world framed
by judicial tradition and hedged about by precedents that shape the range
of decisional options available in any particular case. Traditions and
precedents change over time, but these considerations narrow the degrees
of decisional freedom. This part of the article explores the factors that
likely frame the Court's view of the Bivens action and the doctrine of
qualified immunity.
A.

Discountingthe Bivens Action

Several factors have combined to persuade the Court that the Bivens
decision should not be readily extended beyond the boundaries within
which it currently operates. First, at least two Justices believe that
Bivens was wrong in 1971 to fashion a judge-made right of action instead
of deferring to Congress.104 Second, members of the Court may view the
Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference develops the rules of practice and procedure in
consultation with the bar and promulgates rules that take effect if the Court and Congress
do not object.
103. For a summary of the attitudinalist literature, see Barry Friedman, The Politics of
JudicialReview, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257, 262-63, 270-80 (2005).
104. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Corr.
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Bivens action as primarily a vehicle for the assertion of claims of dubious
merit by pro se prison litigants who have nothing better to do.'0o Third,
and relatedly, the Court may fear the docket implications of recognizing
the existence of a Bivens action. 10 6 Finally, the Court may assume that
other remedies exist for most constitutional torts, thus making the
recognition of a Bivens action less important.' 0 7
In evaluating the strength of these implicit explanations for Bivens
skepticism, we can begin with questions of the legitimacy of judge-made
rights of action. In other work, I have argued that the issue of legitimacy
must take account not only of the legislative framework in place in 1971
but also of the range of legislation since adopted that seems to presume
the viability of a Bivens action.108
Thus, with the adoption of
amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1974 and 1988,
Congress took pains to preserve the Bivens action.' 09 The preservation of
Bivens was noted in the Court's decision in Carlson v. Green,110
commenting on the adoption of the 1974 amendments."' Congress made
the preservation explicit in 1988, declaring that suits against government
officers were generally foreclosed, except suits for "violations of the
Constitution." 1 2 This explicit preservation of the Bivens remedy
deserves greater attention in debates over the action's legitimacy.
In addition, Congress has essentially eliminated the common law
remedies that were routinely available to litigants in the pre-Bivens world

105. One finds an early version of this view in Justice Black's dissenting opinion in
Bivens itself. See Pfander, supra note 3, at 288-89 (recounting Justice Black's concern
for the assertion of potentially groundless claims against well-meaning federal officers).
106. Docket concerns invariably brook large in the decision about whether to
authorize a federal right of action.
107. See, e.g., Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550-51 (treating the possible availability of state
common law remedies as a relevant factor in the Bivens calculus).
108. For an overview of the legislation, see Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 23, at
131-38.
109. The FTCA became law in 1946, imposing liability on the federal government on
a respondeat superior theory for the negligent acts of federal employees. See 60 Stat. 842
(1946). The key to its liability scheme lies in the provision that authorizes jurisdiction
over claims against the federal government for injuries caused by the "negligent or
wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(2006). The FTCA has been twice amended. The first amendment to the FTCA occurred
in 1974 to impose liability on the government for certain specified intentional torts. See
Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50. The Act was amended again in 1988 to immunize
federal officers from common law liability. See Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102
Stat. 4563, 4564-65 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(2)(B) (2006)).
110. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
111. Id. at 16-18.
112. Westfall Act, Section 5, 28 U.S.C § 1346(b) (1997) (permitting a suit against
federal officers for "violation of the Constitution").
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as a way to contest the legality of federal government conduct.113 One
can thus fairly question both the presumption that Bivens lacks legislative
support and the claim that alternative remedies in tort provide an
assurance of remediation. The Westfall Act immunizes federal officers
from all liability on state common law theories of liability for action
taken within the scope of official duties.1 14 Individuals can recover for
common law torts only where the claim falls within the scope of the
In many
FTCA's waiver of government immunity from suit."5
instances, the Westfall Act may block the suit against the officer without
necessarily subjecting the government to liability in the officer's stead. 1 16
With this discontinuity, one should not assume, as the Court apparently
did in Wilkie v. Robbins,'17 that state common law theories of liability
translate seamlessly into liability under the FTCA. While certain of these
claims might be reformulated and asserted against the federal
government under the FTCA, there is no assurance that the FTCA, with
its various exceptions, provides a remedy for the breach of common law
duties.
The assumption that Bivens claims typically lack merit and
therefore constitute a burden on the federal judiciary has been
persuasively refuted by Professor Alex Reinert.118 In an empirical
evaluation of Bivens litigation, Professor Reinert has reckoned that
something on the order of 30% of Bivens claims succeed, either through
settlement or a merits disposition.119 This finding contrasts with the
widely held view that frivolous Bivens claims, like those under section
1983, have multiplied over the past generation to a degree that threatens
to overwhelm the federal judiciary. 120 While theories of government
accountability must take account of the burden that civil rights litigation

113. Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564-65 (1988) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(B) (2006)).

114. Id.
115. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007) (describing the process by which the
attorney general's scope-of-employment certification transforms common law action into
one against the United States under the FTCA).
116. For example, no exception appears in the Westfall Act to preserve the liability of
officers for torts they commit outside the United States, despite the fact that the FTCA
forecloses liability for torts that occur overseas. See United States v. Smith, 507 U.S.
197, 201 (1991).
117. 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
118. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REv. 809, 841 (2010)
(describing an overall success rate of 30% in cases that survive initial screening and in
which an answer or motion is filed).
119. Id. at 841.
120. Id. at 828 n.95 (collecting authorities).
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casts on the federal judiciary, in the case of Bivens litigation, it appears
that the tipping point has not yet been reached.
Public perceptions of prison litigation may inform Bivens
skepticism to some degree. In the popular mind, prisoners sue to secure
recognition of obscure religious practices and to contest prison life as
cruel and unusual punishment. 121 These perceptions doubtless influenced
the adoption of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA),12 2
legislation that restricts in a variety of important ways the ability of state
and federal prisoners to mount federal court challenges to the conditions
of their confinement. Several provisions of the Act in particular apply to
Bivens and section 1983 litigation. First, the statute considerably
strengthens the exhaustion rule, requiring prisoners to file their claims
with prison grievance systems before initiating federal litigation.12 3
Second, the statute establishes an initial screening process that requires
the district court to evaluate the complaint before calling on the
government to respond.12 4 Third, the statute prevents prisoners from
recovering for mental or emotional injuries unless they have suffered a
physical injury.12 5 Fourth, the statute requires prisoners to pay the filing
fee from their prison accounts, thus qualifying the prisoner's right to

121. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment,
84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881, 917 n.145 (2009) (providing an account of the way critics urged
reform of prison litigation through the misleading characterization of prisoner claims).
122. Pub. L.No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006). The PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement
replaced the discretionary approach of prior law and eliminated the old notion that
exhaustion was to be excused where the administrative remedy could prove futile or
where the agency in question lacked the power to order the relief sought by the
prospective litigant. As the Supreme Court has observed, the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement seeks to "reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits."
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 516 (2002). To that end, the Court has taken a fairly
strict view of the requirement. In its most recent decision, the Court refused to excuse the
prisoner's failure to comply with the institutional filing deadline for an internal
grievance. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (2006).
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(2) (2006) (declaring that "no person convicted of a
felony who is incarcerated while awaiting sentencing ... may bring a civil action against
the United States or an agency, officer, or employee of the Government, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.").
Some courts have read the provision broadly to apply to suits seeking compensation for
the invasion of intangible constitutional rights. See, e.g., Allah v. AI-Hafeez, 226 F.3d
247 (3d Cir. 2000) (action for violation of inmate's religious freedom was one for mental
or emotional injury and thus was barred in the absence of physical injury). Other courts
have viewed an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights as actionable in its own right,
quite apart from any resulting emotional or mental distress. See, e.g., Rowe v. Shake,
196 F.3d 778, 781-82 (7th Cir. 1999) (permitting inmate to sue for violation of First
Amendment rights aside from any emotional injury he may have sustained).
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26
proceed in forma pauperis.1
Finally, the statute imposes a three-strikes
provision that forecloses a prisoner with a record of three prior
groundless claims from bringing an IFP suit. 127
The PLRA, perhaps especially its filing fee provision, has been
effective in reducing the number of prison petitions in the federal
courts. 128 It has also been controversial, leading critics to ask if Congress
went too far in limiting access to the federal judiciary.12 9 Critics worry
about the application of the three-strikes provision, fearing that it will
disable prisoners from bringing meritorious claims. Critics have also
questioned the application of the physical injury requirement to
constitutional claims, including claims for violation of religious freedom.
Finally, critics have expressed concern that the broad exhaustion rule
forecloses litigation of meritorious claims by pro se litigants who may
have little knowledge of the particular deadlines they must meet under
the prison grievance system. The American Bar Association has joined
these critics in calling for reform of the PLRA along the lines suggested
in the Prison Abuse Remedies Act. The PARA would roll back some
elements of the PLRA to secure the prisoner's day in court.13 0
The Court's skepticism toward prisoner claims in general and the
free exercise claim in Iqbal in particular, may reflect a perception that
Congress has taken steps to curtail prisoner litigation, thus signaling a
desire to restrict access to a Bivens remedy. Bivens, after all, provides
the primary vehicle for the assertion of prison claims by federal
prisoners.131 (Federal habeas tests only the fact or duration of custody,
rather than the treatment of prisoners by guards and wardens.) Among

126. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2006). The PLRA mandates that prisoners pay a
portion of the filing fees associated with their litigation. In particular, the PLRA imposes
an obligation that inmates draw on funds held in their prison accounts to pay the fees,
often on an installment basis.
127. The PLRA imposes a three-strikes rule, under which inmates can be forbidden
from filing suit in forma pauperis (IFP) where they have had three prior lawsuits
dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a cognizable claim. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2006). As a practical matter, the three-strikes provision means that
prisoners subject to the rule must pay the entire filing fee up front, or their action may not
proceed. The provision includes an exception for suits involving inmates in imminent
danger of serious physical injury.
128. See Margo Schlanger, Preserving the Rule of Law in America's Jails and
Prisons: The Casefor Amending the PrisonLitigationReform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
139,passim (2008).
129. Id. at 142-43.
130. For a summary of the criticisms, and the ABA's support for the Prison Abuse
Remedies Act, see Schlanger, supra note 128, at 141.
131. For state prisoners, of course, section 1983 provides the counterpart to Bivens.
See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010) (reaffirming the viability of section 1983
as vehicle for assertion of Eighth Amendment claims by a state prisoner who alleged that
prison guards used excessive force to subdue him).
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the first Bivens actions recognized was that for a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.132 in
addition, free exercise claims in the prison setting arise with some
frequency and often implicate the PLRA's physical injury requirement.
Congressional concern with prisoner claims may tend to encourage the
Court in its reluctance to recognize what it regards as new rights of
action in the prison setting.
But one can fairly ask if the congressional signals in the PLRA
warrant an attitude of judicial hostility to Bivens claims in the prison
context. While the cruel and unusual punishment clause addresses itself
to the conditions of prison confinement, one has difficulty identifying
other constitutional rights that apply with special force to the prison
setting. Certainly the free exercise clause, though implicated in a wide
range of prison lawsuits, applies to governmental interference with the
profession of faith in other, non-prison settings. A decision to deny a
Bivens remedy could foreclose free exercise claims both in and out of the
prison setting. Skepticism about prison claims in particular should not
drive the Court to curtail constitutional litigation more broadly.
More fundamentally, the adoption of the PLRA can be viewed as
altering the Court's role. In Wilkie v. Robbins,1 33 its most recent
discussion, the Court defined its role in deciding whether to recognize a
new Bivens action as a two-step process. First, the Court must consider
if the existence of an alternative remedy provides a reason for the
judiciary to refrain "from providing a new and freestanding remedy in
damages." 34 Second, a court conducting a Bivens inquiry must exercise
the sort ofjudgment required of a common law tribunal and pay attention
to any "special factors counseling hesitation" before recognizing a "new
kind of federal litigation."'13 ' Normally, as in Bivens itself, the Court
conducts this inquiry with scant legislative guidance, a factor that
encourages a certain skepticism on the part of judges who view the task
of creating a new right of action as a matter for legislative rather than
judicial creativity. In the case of free exercise claims under the PLRA,
however, the Court does not lack for congressional guidance. Congress
enacted the PLRA on the assumption that Bivens suits were available to
enforce prisoner rights to the free exercise of religion; by the time of the
adoption of the PLRA, the lower federal courts had recognized that such
By
claims were viable under both section 1983 and Bivens.'36
132. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
133. 551 U.S. 537, 537 (2006).
134. Id. at 550.
135. Id. at 550 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
136. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing Bivens
action for interference with free exercise of religion); Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F.
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acknowledging the existence of the Bivens action and taking steps to
curtail the features of prison litigation that it viewed as excessive,
Congress took upon itself the task of striking a balance between the
interests in suppressing frivolous litigation and preserving government
accountability.
The congressional response to the Court's analysis of prison
In McCarthy v.
exhaustion schemes nicely illustrates the point.
37
Madigan,1 a Bivens action for deliberate indifference brought under the
Eighth Amendment, the federal government argued that the petitioner
was required to exhaust the federal prison grievance system before
instituting suit in federal court.13 8 The Court (without dissent) reaffirmed
the vitality of the Bivens action in the prison setting and concluded that
the grievance system was inapplicable, in part because it provided no
mechanism for an award of money damages.1 39 The Court (also without
dissent) rejected the argument that the grievance system should be
regarded as an adequate alternative remedy, sufficient to displace the
Bivens scheme.140 In responding to this holding in the PLRA, Congress
did not foreclose the assertion of prison claims under Bivens but rather
made clear that a new, more demanding exhaustion requirement would
apply.141 In short, Congress confirmed and moderated the conclusion in
McCarthy, rather than overthrowing the Bivens remedy.
Because Congress assumed the viability of a Bivens action, and
imposed restrictions aimed at limiting its perceived excesses in the prison
context, it may have altered the judicial role. The federal courts no
longer face the relatively unguided common law right-of-action calculus
described in Wilkie v. Robbins. A Bivens action to enforce free exercise
claims would not create a "new kind of federal litigation," but would
Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (section 1983 claim for retaliation against inmate for the
exercise of religious rights); Scarpino v. Grossheim, 852 F. Supp. 798 (S.D. Iowa 1994).
Other cases recognize the viability of a free exercise claim, before ultimately rejecting the
claim on the merits. See, e.g., Mumin v. Phelps, 857 F.2d 1055, 1056 (5th Cir. 1987);
Garza v. Carlson 877 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1989) (recognizing prisoner's right to practice
religion but concluding that the prison policy reasonably accommodated those rights); Cf
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (recognizing that prisoners retained
their free exercise rights while in prison but concluding that the rights were properly
viewed less as absolutes than as interests to be considered in light of legitimate
penological considerations).
137. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992).
138. See id. at 142.
139. Id. at 152 (reaffirming Bivens and Carlson); id. at 154-55 (rejecting exhaustion
argument due in part to the absence of a monetary remedy).
140. Id. at 151-52.
141. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, (2002) (holding that PLRA's exhaustion
requirement applies to "any suit" brought by prisoners); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731
(2001) (holding that the exhaustion requirement applies to claims for monetary damages
even where the grievance process affords no such remedies).
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simply confirm the existence of a right of action that Congress has
acknowledged and trimmed back to its own specifications for use in a
system of litigation designed to ensure prison accountability. The
litigation has already arrived on the dockets of the federal courts. 4 2
Formal recognition of a Bivens action would add no new category of
claims to the federal workload but would simply confirm the status quo
as modified by Congress. Rejection of the action, by contrast, would
likely interfere with the congressional balance, foreclosing claims that
Congress simply meant to screen or qualify to ensure their viability.
The free exercise claim in Iqbal thus presents an interpretive
problem quite different from those in such earlier Bivens-restrictive cases
as Bush v. Lucasl4 3 and Schweiker v. Chilicky.144 In Bush, an aerospace
engineer claimed that federal employees had retaliated against him in the
workplace to punish him for the exercise of free speech rights.145 Having
successfully pursued remedies under a federal workplace protection
statute, the employee sought additional remedies on a Bivens theory.'46
As the case came to the Court, then, the employee was inviting the
creation of "a new kind of federal litigation" in a field where Congress
had been quite active in balancing competing policies and providing
tailored relief.14 7 Similarly, in Schweiker, the Court confronted a claim
that the procedures used to process a Social Security disability claim
violated due process.14 8 Again emphasizing the degree to which
Congress had taken the matter in hand, the Court refused to recognize a
Bivens action. As the Court explained, when the "design of [the]
Government program" suggests that Congress had provided appropriate
remedies for the claims at issue, "we have not created additionalBivens
remedies." 4 9 Both cases thus involved an attempt to introduce a new
theory of constitutional litigation into an area where Congress had
supplied "comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving
meaningful remedies against the United States."'
In the case of prisoner claims, the posture of deference to the
PLRA's federal regulatory scheme would require the Court to confirm
the existence of a Bivens action. If the Court were to curtail the right to
142. See John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act at 161-63 (2008)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) (collecting examples of religious liberty
litigation brought by prisoners).
143. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
144. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
145. Bush, 462 U.S. at 369-70.
146. Id. at 374.
147. Id. at 378.
148. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 4 17-18.
149. Id. at 423.
150. Id. at 422 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 368).
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sue for such religious freedom claims, it would represent a sizable
judicial disruption of the balance Congress struck. Somewhat counterintuitively, therefore, the PLRA confirms rather than displaces the Bivens
action in the prison context. 151
B.

Bivens Skepticism and QualifiedImmunity Enthusiasm

If some traditional justifications for Bivens skepticism do not appear
well grounded, one can also raise questions about the Court's expansion
of qualified immunity. After Bivens came down in 1971, the Court
began to re-fashion the rules of qualified immunity to create nationally
uniform rules that turn less on the official's duties and mental state and
more on the state of the law.15 2 The avowed justification for the change
was to strike an appropriate balance between the interests of the victims
of government misconduct and those of government officials. 53 While
the Court has expressed ongoing reluctance to perform the "legislative"
function of recognizing an implied right of action, it has not voiced
similar doubts about the wisdom of (or its capacity to formulate) a judgemade body of qualified immunity law.
While we have grown accustomed to its role, the Court's
willingness to take the lead in calibrating official immunity looks a good
deal more adventuresome when viewed from the perspective of the early
nineteenth century. Back then, the courts simply applied common law
precepts in determining official liability; it was for Congress to create
any appropriate immunity through the adoption of statutory limits on
151. One might argue that the provisions of the PLRA do not apply to the claim
asserted by Iqbal and thus provide little support for the existence of a Bivens action.
Iqbal brought suit after he had served his time and gained release from custody. As a
result, the PLRA apparently does not apply to him. He's no longer a "prisoner" within
the meaning of the Act and no longer subject to the various restrictions the Act imposes.
Yet there's a strong argument that the purpose of the PLRA was to mimic the market
conditions that Iqbal faced and that typically govern the initiation of litigation by
individuals outside of prison. The market often ensures that litigants who file suit
through attorneys make credible commitments about the validity of the claims they
assert. Litigants can proceed, in most instances, only by persuading an attorney to take
their case. Contingent fee lawyers, and lawyers working for public interest firms, will
accept such representation only where they calculate that the prospects for success justify
the investment of costs and fees associated with the litigation. Prisoners, by contrast,
faced few such constraints before the adoption of the PLRA; they could file pro se
actions on an IFP basis without posting a filing fee. The PLRA seeks to require prisoners
to make credible commitments, both by paying the filing fee from their prison account
and by submitting to an initial screening of their complaint. The combined effect of these
limits provides assurances of the viability of prisoner claims that may, to some extent,
seek to duplicate those afforded by the market.
152. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
153. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (describing this balancing
approach).
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common law liability. 15 4 Similarly, Congress took it upon itself to ensure
that officers did not bear the ultimate liability for actions taken in the
course of their employment. It did so by adopting a series of private
bills, appropriating money from the treasury to indemnify the officials
for any losses suffered due to action taken in accordance with their
instructions. 55 Finally, Congress sought to ensure the proper balance
between respect for private rights and official zeal by creating incentives
in the officer's compensation package. Some officers were put on salary;
others earned fees and commissions for work well done.' 56 In this world,
courts simply applied the law. Congress was obliged to calibrate pay and
indemnity assurances sufficient to attract able candidates to offices that
entailed risks of personal liability.
The nineteenth century alternative does not necessarily cast doubt
on the Court's modern role or on its willingness to fashion qualified
immunity law. But it does reveal that there's nothing inherent in the
Court's current allocation lawmaking competence. Today, as we have
seen, the Court emphasizes the legislative role in fashioning rights of
action and the judicialrole in the development of immunity rules. In the
nineteenth century, the roles were reversed. Courts took the lead in
developing and extending common law rights of action and Congress
balanced the threat of liability and the need for official zeal in the course
of adopting immunity statutes and applying indemnity rules. One
advantage of the nineteenth century approach was that it enabled
Congress to tailor incentives to the particulars of an officer's duties.
A variety of factors contributed to the change from the nineteenth to
the twentieth century model of government accountability. But two
appear particularly significant. First, Congress came to recognize that it
lacked the institutional resources to address the petitions for private relief
that flowed into its halls from individuals with money claims against the
government. The sheer burden of processing petitions led Congress to
create the Court of Claims in 1855, as an alternative institution for claims
on the fisc.' 57 Similarly, among the factors that led in 1946 to the
adoption of the FTCA was the perception that Congress was drowning in
154. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: FederalAdministration and
Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1679-80
(2007) (describing the efforts of the Jefferson administration to secure immunizing
legislation and Congress's reluctance to enact it).
155. See supra note 44 (collecting examples).
156. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 36, (describing the combination of fees, salaries,
and forfeiture commissions that Congress used in fashioning employment compensation
for federal officers).
157. See Floyd Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The
Evolutionfrom a Legislative to a JudicialModel ofPayment, 45 LA. L. REv. 626, 651-52
(1985).
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petitions from individuals who sought compensation for the tortious
conduct of government officials.158 The solution, adopted as part of postwar legislative reorganization, was to create tort liability running against
the government for actions taken by government officials in the scope of
employment, and thus to transfer the good faith and course of
employment issues to the courts for resolution.159 With this shift,
Congress not only waived its immunity from suit but also put the federal
courts into the business of evaluating course-of-employment issues that
had long been the province of the legislature.
Second, the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
eliminated the body of general federal common law on which the federal
courts had drawn in its leading official liability cases.160 By making it
clear that the law to be applied was state law (except where the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States otherwise require or
provide), Erie created the very real possibility that in tort suits aimed at
enforcing constitutional rights, both the right to sue the federal official
and the incidents of official liability would be governed by state law. 16 '
Counsel in the Bivens case drew the Court's attention to Erie's lesson:
without a federal right of action, the rights of individuals would depend
on state law and could vary throughout the country in accordance with
local definitions of the common law, local conceptions of the proper
measure of damages, and perhaps local defenses created for police

officers.162
The decision to recognize a Bivens action seems to have compelled
the federal courts to develop a matching set of immunity principles. On
remand in Bivens itself, the government officials argued that they should
be accorded an absolute immunity from suit as federal drug enforcement
officers acting in the scope of their employment. The Second Circuit

158. See Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 50 (1942) (reporting Department of Justice
estimate that passage of the FTCA would reduce the number of private claim bills in
Congress by 40%).
159. See Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
160. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For early cases in which suits
against government officials played a prominent role, see Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (holding that a suit against the collector of Ohio
taxes was not one against the state); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804)
(upholding imposition of substantial liability on naval captain who seized a Danish vessel
in the good faith belief that it was violating the American non-intercourse act with
France).
161. Notably, the Bivens decision came down in 1971, nearly forty years ago but only
thirty-three years after the Erie decision was announced. Bivens v. Six Unknown-Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
162. See Pfander, supra note 3, at 284 (describing the argument against leaving the
measure of liability to the "vicissitudes of state law").
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rejected this argument as one that would effectively nullify the newlyrecognized Bivens liability.' 63 In the struggle to provide some content to
official immunity, lower court divisions attracted Supreme Court
attention. The shifting pattern of official immunity, from the inquiry into
the officer's good faith that was announced in 1967 (pre-Bivens) to one
that uniformly defined immunity by reference to federal law in 1982,
doubtless reflects the switch to a federal liability rule.164 It would be
awkward to conclude that state law immunity rules vitiate a liability
grounded in supreme federal law. Thus, the pressure for a uniform
federal standard that led in part to the recognition of Bivens liability also
produced a federal immunity rule. Victims and government officials
alike can make a strong claim for a consistent federal standard.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court's regime of qualified
immunity appears to follow derivatively from its recognition of a federal
right of action under Bivens. But the need for a uniform standard does
not necessarily entail federal judicial control of the content of the
standard or the adoption of the Harlow rule. Had the Court sought
congressional guidance, it could have specified a no-immunity baseline,
thus imposing liability on officers for any constitutional violations they
commit (in keeping with the strictures of the nineteenth century).
Congress might have responded by waiving its sovereign immunity from
suit for constitutional torts, by setting forth a more protective official
immunity standard, or by establishing a more reliable way to indemnify
officers from personal liability. By assigning immunity issues to the
legislature, the Court might thus have preserved the nineteenth century
allocation of functions, with the definition of liability retained as a
judicial responsibility and the regulation of immunity and indemnity left
to Congress.
Yet the dynamic quality of federal constitutional law made the
choice of strict official liability an unattractive baseline. Indeed, one can
perhaps best understand the "clear law" standard in Harlow as a
reflection of the evolving nature of constitutional norms. 16 5 Even
government officials striving in good faith to conform their actions to the
law cannot always anticipate the twists and turns of constitutional law.
The perceived unfairness of holding officers accountable for legal
assessments they could not anticipate helps to drive official immunity
law. Notably, however, the same uncertainty attended actions taken by
government officials in the nineteenth century. Captain Little and

163. See Bivens, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347-48 (2d Cir. 1972).
164. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
165. See Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1731, 1820-24 (1991).
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revenue collector Sands both had arguments for the legality of their
actions. They were, nonetheless, held strictly accountable to the victims
of their enforcement activities and expected to secure indemnity from

Congress. 166
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the end, then, one has difficulty accounting for qualified
immunity jurisprudence other than as an effort on the Court's part to
strike its own balance between the interests of victims and the
government. Such a balance-striking effort bears more than a passing
resemblance to much that goes on in the world of constitutional
litigation, including the judgment entailed in recognizing a Bivens right
of action. It's difficult, at least for me, to see the two crucial elements of
constitutional tort liability, the right of action and the immunity defense,
as different in kind for judicial lawmaking purposes. As a matter of
history, the Court appears to have taken up the task of re-shaping
qualified immunity shortly after its recognition of the Bivens action.
Indeed, the Court's own decisions make clear that these nominally
separate questions blend in practice into a single inquiry into the content
of "clearly established" law. That was, after all, the question that the
Iqbal Court set out to resolve in evaluating the sufficiency of the
complaint.

166.

See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.

